Abstract: The development of new methods and rep resentations for temporal decision-making requires a principled basis for characterizing and measuring the flexibility of decision strategies in the face of uncertainty. Our goal in this paper is to provide a framework -not a theory -for observing how decision policies behave in the face of informational perturbations, to gain clues as to how they might behave in the face of unanticipated, possibly unartic ulated uncertainties. To this end, we find it beneficial to distinguish between two types of uncertainty: "Small World" uncertainty and "Large World" uncertainty. The first type can be resolved by posing an unambiguous question to a "clairvoyant," and is anchored on some well-defined aspect of a decision frame. The second type is more troublesome, yet it is often of greater interest when we address the issue of flexibility; this type of uncertainty can be resolved only by consulting a "psychic." We next observe that one approach to flexibility frequently used in the economics literature is already implicitly accounted for in the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) princi ple from decision theory. Though simple, the obser vation establishes the context for a more illuminating notion of flexibility, what we term flex ibility with respect to information revelation. We show how to perform flexibility analysis of a static (i.e., single period) decision problem using a simple example, and we observe that the most flexible alter native thus identified is not necessarily the MEU alternative. We extend our analysis for a dynamic (i.e., multi-period) model, and we demonstrate how to calculate the value of flexibility for decision strat egies that allow downstream revision of an upstream commitment decision.
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Flexibility, Uncertainty, and Information
Researchers in decision-making under uncertainty have recognized the importance of developing models and methods that more adequately address the notion of time:
How do decisions taken now shape or constrain decision opportunities confronted in the future? Whether we are building decision analyses to clarify human-oriented pol icy decisions or algorithms to approximate intelligent agency in a robot, the question poses a significant chal lenge for any methodology which claims to provide a complete, normative basis for action. Planning systems, for example, need rigorous methods for judging whether a particular plan is more "brittle" or less "flexible" than another, as well as sensible metrics for quantifying those features precisely. Decision consultants, meanwhile, increasingly focus on building strategies that create and sustain value for a decision maker or an organization over time, strategies that are somehow robust in the face of rap idly changing circumstances and unanticipated outcomes.
The reason we care about notions such as flexibility, brit tleness, and robustness in decision-making is that the world is uncertain. If the world were perfectly determinis tic -or even approximately so -we could simply order our actions to respond to future events using propositional logic. For the many problem areas where such reasoning falls short, we model uncertainty using the axiomatic framework of probability theory. Utility theory provides a normative basis for action using the probabilities assessed by a decision maker. Flexibility enters the discussion because we would like our actions to accommodate uncer tain outcomes, and even better, to respond to uncertainties that we perhaps do not explicitly consider at the time we make a decision. As the mechanism through which we reduce uncertainty, information ought to figure promi nently in any analysis of flexibility: given more informa tion, we might do otherwise and thereby achieve higher value; the revelation of information downstream of a deci sion often creates or constrains opportunities to respond effectively to our upstream commitments.
Practicing decision analysts use a variety of sensitivity techniques to determine which sources of uncertainty weigh most heavily in the identification of optimal courses of action (see, for example, [Morgan and Henrion, 1990] 
Distinctions about Uncertainty
We can think of flexibility generally as "the ability to adapt to changing circumstances" [Mandelbaum, 1978] . Another type of missing but knowable information relates to those alternatives, uncertainties, or preferences that we have not explicitly defined or articulated. This type of information corresponds to Large World uncertainty. For example, knowing that the next coin flip will cause your opponent to suffer a heart attack at the gambling table cer tainly counts as missing, knowable information, but it probably is not anything we explicitly include in our bet ting analysis. In general, Large World uncertainties can be resolved only by posing open-ended questions to a psy chic: for example, "Will anything strange happen when I next flip this coin?" Hypothetical answer: "Yes, your opponent will suffer a heart attack while it is in the air."
Large World uncertainties are those uncertainties that we have not already specified, even though their outcomes could significantly affect the value we achieve.
Missing but knowable information provided by a clairvoy ant corresponds exactly to the class of Small World uncer tainties. Missing but knowable information provided by a psychic corresponds exactly to the class of Large World uncertainties.
Missionaries and cannibals revisited
The Large World/Small World distinction is key because it draws the line between what's possible and what's infeasi ble for flexibility analysis. We worry about flexibility in decision-making because we want our decision strategies to be responsive to a range of uncertain outcomes. But such strategies can be responsive only with respect to uncertainty that we deliberately, explicitly articulate.
It is perhaps useful to think of an analogue to the well known AI Frame Problem in this context: Suppose you are charged with the task of transporting a group of missionar ies safely between opposite sides of a river. Cannibals lurk in the bushes at both banks. A decision-analytic treatment of the problem would take account of the risks of encoun tering cannibals at different locations along the banks, given rustling movements in the bushes, say, and the dis utility of getting shot by a cannibal's arrow. In implement ing a decision strategy for transporting the missionaries, you might attempt to take action that flexibly accommo dates all manner of bizarre risks. For example, you might worry about the possibility of an oar snapping in half or the possibility of a sudden, violent thunderstorm erupting while you are crossing the river.
Yet it is clearly impossible-and certainly impractical to include all such remotely relevant, low-probability uncertainties in your analysis. Suppose for the moment that you construct a plan flexible enough to handle a snap ping oar or a violent thunderstorm, and you begin to cross the river. In the middle of the river, your boat pops a leak and sinks; the missionaries drown and die, while the can nibals at the banks wail and wring their hands at their loss. Regardless of how flexible you thought your plan was, it certainly was not flexible enough to accommodate this bizarr e circumstance.
It is important to observe that sometimes the unanticipated event can be beneficial. For example, the cannibals might be away for the wedding of their chieftain's daughter in a nearby village. Yet this is probably outside the realm of anything a reasonable person would include in a plan for transporting missionaries. Trying to accommodate all pos sible uncertainty -particularly Large World uncertainty -in flexibility analysis is infeasible, and probably inco herent in any case. The difficulty with this is that people often evaluate actions retroactively with respect to out comes on Large World uncertainties. For example, if the boat pops a leak and sinks, then you are accused of imple menting a ''bad" plan to save the missionaries. If you are a decision analyst, then you respond that a leak in the boat was not even in the realm of discourse at the time you for mulated the model; the event was vaguely relevant to the decision, but only marginally more relevant than a host of other variables which appear natural to eliminate from the analysis. The best we can do-and this is the thrust of the framework we propose in this paper-is to analyze flexi bility with special attention to Small World uncertainty, in an effort to gain clues as to how strategies thus analyzed will behave in the face of Large World uncertainty.
Flexibility on Outcomes
We define a decision problem as a triple
, where X is a vector of state variables [X1, ... .Xn1• n (X) is the space of outcomes over X, and D is a single decision with m alternatives [d1 , ... ,dm1· We will use capital letters to denote a variable or decision, and lower-case let ters to denote a corresponding value or alternative, respec tively: e.g., D denotes the decision, and d1 denotes a particular alternative for it; X is a state variable, and x denotes a particular value for X. We will also use O(X) to denote the set of possible values for X, where X can be a state variable or a decision: e.g., de n (D) and x e n (X) . The value function v(d,x) specifi es the pay off/value/utility when action dis taken and outcome
X may be defined probabilistically. If X is a random vari able, then P{XI�} denotes a probability mass or probabil ity density assignment on X, conditional on �, our prior state of knowledge. We will use E[v(D,X)I�] to denote the expected value of v(D,X). We will also use Ex[v(D,X)II�] to denote the same measure, subscripting by X to indicate that the expectation is taken with respect to X. Merkhofer [1975] ). Stigler characterizes the flexibility of two alternative plants using the second derivative of their total cost curves: a less flexible Plant A has a second deriv ative that is strictly greater than the second derivative cor responding to a more flexible Plant B, for all possible output values X. Figure I demonstrates the idea. x *
X=Ou put
Both plants achieve minimum cost at the same level of output x*, and Plant A actually beats Plant B for output x * . Yet intuitively, it seems that we should prefer Plant B because of the flexibility it gives us over a broader ranger of possible output values for X. Figure 2 shows the same kind of problem cast in decision terms. The decision depicted has three alternatives; the value curve for each is labeled by the decision alternative. In the sense introduced by Stigler, it appears that tf" is most flexible in that it returns nearly constant value over the entire range of X.
FIGURE 2. Stigler-type flexibility for a decision problem with three alternatives.
v(d,X)
X We might say that a+" is most flexible, or least brittle, in the sense that it minimizes the cumulative distance between itself and the upper boundary of the value curves for each of the available alternatives. Though d * and a have value curves that peak more highly at separate points, a+" does not suffer the severe dips in value that d* and a show over broader ranges of values for X. Because X is given proba bilistically, we must weigh this cumulative distance by its probability of occurrence under P{XI�}. In the spirit of Stigler, let us entertain the following definition.
Definition 1. The brittleness of action d; with respect to outcomes X is given by
The least brittle action is the one that minimizes the pre ceding quantity.
It is useful to observe the intended duality between the notions of flexibility and brittleness. Aexible strategies are less brittle because they do not ''break" as easily in the face of unexpected outcomes. Brittle strategies are less flexible because they do not respond effectively to new discoveries or unanticipated outcomes.
Definition 1 seems to capture an intuitively appealing notion of flexibility following a standard approach from the literature. The following result shows that this notion of flexibility -which we will denote F VO• for flexibility with respect to outcomes -is already implicit in the Max imum Expected Utility (MEU) principle from decision theory.
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Theorem 1: The optimal MEU action is the least brittle decision in the sense of Definition 1. 
We can expand the right-hand side as follows:
The first term inside the bracketed expression is a constant function, the upper envelope of the certainty equivalent curves for the different decision alternatives. Therefore minimizing the entire bracketed expression amounts to maximizing the second term inside the bracket -but this term is just the MEU decision, and the result follows. o Theorem 1 shows that flexibility with respect to outcome is already embedded in the MEU principle from decision theory. In effect, any time one performs decision analysis, one gets F vo for free. While the result might seem to triv ialize our current notion of brittleness, it actually indicates where the useful work lies: to establish a clear notion of flexibility or brittleness which is tied to what we might call variability over belief, not simply variability over out come.
Flexibility and Information Revelation: The Static Case
When we face the possibility of receiving missing but knowable information, we use Bayes' Rule to update our beliefs. It is precisely the prospect of receiving new infor mation on a Small World uncertainty that leads us to revise -or wish that we could revise -an upstream commit ment. If we do not have such information on-hand, we cannot update a probability assessment with which to make a more informed decision. For Large World uncer tainty, the variable we would update has not even been introduced into the analysis.
If we are using parameterized probability distributions to represent our uncertainty, however, it is possible to ask how new information could affect our decisions over the entire range of what we might discover. Missing but know able information allows us to update parameters on uncer tainties within a decision model. Even if we do not have such information on-hand, we can nevertheless measure the extent to which decision strategies shift in response to perturbations in our beliefs about underlying uncertainties. Thus, flexibility analysis should focus on second-order uncertainty, and, in particular, sensitivity to second-order uncertainty (see, e.g., [Howard, 1988] , [Pearl, 1988] , [Heckerman and Jimison, 1987] , [Chavez, 1995] .)
For simplicity, assume a decision model with a single uncertainty P{XI�} parameterized by a parameter 1t. For example, if X is a binomial or geometric random variable, then 1t could be the probability of success. Suppose that a decision maker assesses a value function v(d,x) and a prior probability 1t0 for P{XI�}. In Figure 3 , we graph the cer tainty equivalent lines for three alternatives, i.e., E[v(d,x) In this sense, we assert that ct is less brittle than tf with respect to variability of belief. Or, equivalently, we say that ct is more flexible under information revelation than tf.
Definition 2: Suppose that n parameterizes P{XI �},and that P{ nl �} is the uniform distribution. The brittleness or action d1 with respect to variability or belief n is given by
The least brittle action in this sense is the one that mini mizes the preceding quantity.
An Example: The Party Problem
To see how this analysis works, consider the problem of determining where to have a party. The alternatives are "outdoors,'' "porch,'' and "indoors," and the uncertain deci sion variable is the weather, which can have two out comes, either "rain" or "shine." Suppose that we represent our decision maker's utility via the following pay-off func tion (in dollars) with a set of decision alternatives D=[Porch,Outdoors, Indoors] and two possible states of the world for weather, {rain, shine}. Let X denote the Bernoulli state variable on weather, and suppose that the decision maker assesses a 0. 8 chance of sunshine on the day of the party. It is easy to verify that the optimal MEU decision d * is to have the party Outdoors, with expected value $80.
The decision maker is relatively confident about the proba bility of sunshine, and thus it is little surprise that the anal ysis suggest a party outdoors. He would like to understand his decision better, but he is reluctant to spend a lot of time analyzing it (buying groceries and setting up for the party are more urgent worries), and he is unwilling to spend too much time trying to examine all the possible evidence he could gather that would lead him to change his mind. He decides to perform a quick flexibility analysis, to answer the question, "How could missing but knowable informa tion revealed later affect my ability to achieve value now?"
The breakpoint probabilities are .375 and .667, approxi mately, and it straightforward to verify that the certainty equivalent (CE) curves for the three alternatives are given as functions of n: , the probability of sunshine, as follows:
Porch: CEp(n:) = 20+70n:
Indoors: CE1(n:) =50-IOn:
Outdoors: CE0(n: )= lOOn:
A sample calculation of the brittleness of the Indoors alter native with respect to variability of belief on n: proceeds as follows: Similar analyses for Porch and Outdoors give brittleness measures of $7.29 and $12. 74, respectively. Thus, our analysis indicates that Porch is the most flexible, or least brittle, alternative. Its brittleness measure, $7.29, repre sents the cumulative expected loss to the decision maker without information that could lead him to believe differ ently about the probability of sunshine.
Flexibility and Clairvoyance
Now consider the case where the decision maker is able to consult a clairvoyant free of charge. When the clairvoyant predicts "Sun," the decision maker moves the party out doors to achieve value 100, while if the clairvoyant pre dicts "Rain," he moves the party indoors to achieve value 50. As a function of n: , his certainty equivalent with free clairvoyance can thus be described as lOOn: +50(1-n: )=50+50n:. The reader can verify that this line connects the intercepts at CE0(n: =l) and CE1(n: =0).
A different but related measure of brittleness compares the cumulative difference in expected value that the decision maker achieves by sticking to a particular alternative and the expected value he achieves given free clairvoyance. The expected value given free clairvoyance is the gold standard for flexible action in a static model, because it represents the value the decision maker achieves by gath ering all missing but knowable information free of charge before taking action.
Definition 3: Suppose that n parameterizes P{XI �},and that P{ Til�} is the uniform distribution. The brittleness of action d1 with respect to variability of belief n, given clairvoyance on X, is
The measure of brittleness in this sense preserves exactly the ordering on alternatives implied by Definition 2, and is always greater than or equal to the brittleness measure given in Definition 2. In general, it seems to be slightly easier to calculate. An example for Porch is given below:
Measures for Indoors and Outdoors are $30 and $25, respectively.
Flexibility and Information Revelation: The Dynamic Model
Recall that our primary concern in studying flexibility is to take action now which allows us to respond effectively to changing circumstances, and, in particular, to make opti mal use of information revealed in the future. Consider the simple two-period decision model depicted in Figure 4 . could have achieved otherwise. The option to revise is typ ically never free , first because the information gathered at e will usually cost money or resources, and second because most real world revision decisions incur what we might call "s witching costs. " Figures 5 and 6 illustrate two possible sets of certainty equivalent curves for the decision model depicted in Figure 4 . We assume that X is binomial, that the decision maker's prior on X is 1t 0 , and that after evidence e, the decision maker's posterior on X is either 1t or � . The cost of revision plus the cost of informa tion e is w. This simple decision scenario is characterized by a com mitment decision C, a reaction or revision decision R which temporally follows C, uncertainty X, information/ evidence e relevant to X which arrives before R is taken, and a value function v(c,r ,K). The arc from C toR denotes the fact that we remember the decision we took at C when we are downstream at decision R.
Suppose now that C has one of three possible alternatives {tr ,tf,d * }, and that only d*"allows revision at R. In other words, a and d* are strong commitments in the sense that they do not allow revision, while tr allows the possibility of revision to a or d* at R. It is important to observe that tr is not necessarily more flexible than the other alternatives; the possibility to revise yields greater flexibility only if it allows us to achieve greater value downstream than we In both figures, dotted lines represent the certain equiva lents of the decision alternatives d* and a minus the cost w. In both, we represent the certainty equivalent line with information e by a heavy line; similar to the case with clairvoyance presented in Section 4.2, it is the line con necting the two outer intercepts of expected value achieved with information. For example, if we perform cf at C and then update our belief about x to equal ft after observing e, then we revise our decision to d * and achieve expected value at the level t shown in Figure 5 . Traveling along this heavy line and taking its value at x = x ' , our prior assessment, gives the value with flexibility of alter native ct. Since this point is below the expected value achieved with d*, ct does not yield superior flexibility value in scenario 1.
In scenario 2, however, an analogous argument shows that ct yields superior flexibility value. After information e, we are able to achieve higher expected value in revising our decision than if we stick to a commitment d* or a. The value of the flexibility in a is just the difference indicated by F in Figure 6 . We formalize this idea in the following definition.
Definition 4: We are given a decision model with tempo rally ordered decision C and R, information e revealed before R and after C, and value function v(c,r,X'). Informa tion e is relevant to X. Then the flexibility value of a com mitment c with respect to the revelation of information e, denoted Fe(c), is given by
where the outside expectation of the first term is taken with respect to e and the inside expectation is with respect to X. The commitment which maximizes this quantity for values strictly greater than zero is the most flexible com mitment.
Example
Let us return to the Party Problem. Suppose now that the decision maker has the opportunity to commit to having the party outdoors or indoors; or he can accept a "soft" commitment to having the party on the porch, with the possibility of revising the porch decision later. If he chooses the porch now, he will have the opportunity to receive a meteorologist's report the day of the party. Sup pose that the meteorologist's report costs only $1, and he further estimates a switching cost of $5 to move plates and tables from the porch to his living room or from the porch to his backyard. Hence the total cost to revise his decision is $6.
Our decision maker is a bit less confident of the probabil ity of sunshine than before. He estimates the probability of rain at .7; the optimal action is still to have the party out doors with expected payoff $70, if he chooses not to accept the Porch option. Suppose that the metereologist's one-day forecasts are highly reliable, with accuracy proba bility .9 (i.e., if he says "Rain," then it rains with probabil ity .9, and if he says "Sun," then it is sunny with probability .9).
Given these assessments, the decision maker's posterior on rain given a "Rain" report from the meteorologist is .79, and his posterior on sun given a "Sun" report is �95. Thus, if the meteorologist says "Sun," the decision-maker moves outdoors with expected payoff $95-$6=$89, and if he says "Rain" he goes inside with expected payoff $47.9-$6=$41.9. Ta king expectation over the preposterior on evi dence -in this example, the reader can verify that the preposterior probability that the meteorologist reports "sun" is.66 -we find that the expected payoff to the deci sion maker with the Porch option is $72.9. This number is the first term in Definition 4. The flexibility value is the difference between this $72.9 and $70, or roughly three dollars.
Thus, in this example, the flexible alternative is the supe rior alternative, with an expected value difference to the decision maker of about $3.
Conclusions and Future Directions
The definition of flexibility as the ability to achieve value given the future revelation of missing but knowable infor mation allows us to examine decision strategies in a new light. We have shown that MEU fully captures one type of flexibility, what we have termed flexibility with respect to values on outcomes. We have also identified a distinct, possibly useful, notion of flexibility, what we call flexibil ity with respect to information revelation. By anchoring our analysis on the entire range of beliefs that we might hold about our uncertainty, it is possible to measure the relative brittleness or flexibility of alternate strategies as the change in expected value to the decision maker, given information that could lead him to act differently. Static and dynamic analyses of decision scenarios allow us place precise flexibility values on different strategies, in a man ner which confirms intuition for the simple problem con sidered here. Further work will focus on applying the framework developed here to larger models with many decisions and on exploring more of the framework's theo retical implications.
